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S u m m a r y
This paper tries to provide an introduction to the subject of the part 
played by Italy's steel industry in the process of European integration. It 
is divided into three parts. In the first one there will be a brief survey 
of the post-war standing of Italy's steelmaking up to the beginning of 1950. 
Particular attention will be given to the attempts at negotiating a Franco- 
Italian steel entente, whereas other points, related to the OEEC measures of 
liberalization and investment control, will be dealt with more briefly. In 
the second part attention will focus on reactions to the Schuman Plan in the 
months of May and June 1950, which appear to shed some light on the nature 
of national reconstruction and on attitudes towards international 
integration. Finally, in the last part, a brief overview of the outcome of 
the Schuman Plan negotiations will be given, in an attempt to reach a first






















































































































































































Italy's unsuccessful attempt to rise to the status of a great power 
during the Thirties suffered from the severe handicap of a weak met­
allurgical industry. In 1938 figures of steel production were extremely low 
when compared to those of other European powers —  2,32 million tons against 
6,22 for France, 22,6 for Germany and 10,50 for Great Britain (1). This was 
true notwithstanding the fact that a considerable process of reorganization 
and investment was taking place, especially in the large sector of the steel 
industry that had passed under control of Iri-Finsider, a state holding 
company (2). During the war Italy relied on Germany for provisions of raw 
materials as well as for finished steel products: coal imports were about 
800,000 tons a month, and those of steel amounted to about 900,000 tons a 
year over a period from 1940 to 1943 (3).
After defeat, occupation, political and economic difficulties in post­
war reconstruction, Italy's future role was far from clear; in particular, 
doubts persisted as to what extent it would represent an important market 
for European steel production. The question seemed once again one of "to be 
or not to be". Lacking any significant supply of raw materials, was it 
really convenient to pursue the programme of the Thirties, aimed at achiev­
ing a fully independent, vertically integrated steel capacity? In the free- 
trade mood of the Reconstruction, unfavourable to any kind of state 





























































































political, elite, comprising a part of the same steel industrialists, 
remained highly sceptical (4).
All the same, the Finsider Plan, also named after Sinigaglia, one of 
its creators and main supporters, and in many ways a resumption of the so- 
called "Autarchic Plan for Steel", already under implementation at the 
beginning of the war, received growing attention (5). The Plan allowed for a 
production of about 3 million tons of steel by 1952, a little below the 
level of what was thought to be the future internal demand; a rather modest 
objective, considering the low level of per-head consumption of the country 
(6). The Plan was very careful to strike a compromise between steel fac­
tories operating on scrap through electric furnaces, privately owned by 
industrialists in the north of Italy, and vertically integrated works, 
relying on iron ore and run by Finsider. The latter were to be three mass- 
production units located by the sea at Piombino, Bagnoli and Cornigliano. 
The financing of the new machinery was to come from ERP allocations. The 
dimensions and locations of the modernized plants were expected to lower 
production costs and make the steel industry for the first time competitive 
on the international scale. Thus, it was argued, Italy's industrial 
prospects would rest on a firmer basis and in particular the development of 
the engineering industry, responsible, among other things, for an important 
part of the country's exports, would be greatly encouraged.
The Plan, however, was subject to a number of conditions. Though ap­




























































































sectors of the private steelmaking, who were ready to engage in a struggle 
to maintain the highest proportion of the market. The contest focused, as 
was to be expected, on the distribution of American aid, and ECA authorities 
found themselves inundated with complaints about the exaggerated aims of 
Finsider and the danger of handing over to the State a large part of the 
heavy industry. A distinguished place among these accusers was held by the 
Falcks, owners of the most important private steel factory. Fiat, however, 
which was, among other things, the second national private steel producer, 
concluded an agreement with Finsider, committing itself to the purchase of a 
fixed proportion of the coils that were to be produced in Cornigliano, where 
a continuous strip mill was expected to begin functioning in 1953. The 
agreement with Fiat apparently was a decisive argument in winning American 
approval (7).
Given the weak international standing of Italian steelmaking as a 
whole, a certain measure of agreement was reached in supporting the 3 mil­
lion ton objective. In OEEC, however, after a first recognition, gained in 
1948, when the organization worked on the assumption of a growing demand, 
Italian investment programmes were met with growing reservations. In this 
respect, a comparison with investment rates in other countri.es shows the 
small weight that was carried by the Italian programmes in the context of 
the envisaged new European capacity. Investment figures in 1949 for Great 
Britain and France amounted to 72 and 66 million pounds sterling, whereas 
the total of investment in steel plants in Italy up to the end of 1950 was 




























































































Another risk-factor for the implementation of the Sinigaglia Plan lay 
in productive realities, which in the industrial field claim a validity of 
their own, often overruling long-term programmes. In fact, the conditions of 
a sellers market, which continued well into 1948, did much to diminish the 
country's disadvantage, owing to high prices and the delay in pursuing 
modernization (9). By 1948 steel production was still below the prewar 
figure of 1938, and the situation did not change until 1950. Production 
figures for pig iron were much lower, reaching in 1949 less than half the 
1938 level and showing the extent to which Italian steelmaking still relied 
on imports of semi-finished products as well as on scrap-processing. The 
ratio between pig iron and steel was by far the lowest among the countries 
of the future SCSC, being of 23% in 1950 against an average in the six 
countries of 84%. It was planned to raise it to around 50% and Finsider 
pledged to supply about three quarters of the pig iron (10).
A further question lay in the question of raw materials. The underlying 
assumption of the Sinigaglia Plan had been that scrap would no longer be 
available as in the pre-war years, when Italy had purchased great quantities 
(a yearly average of about 600,000 tons with peaks of 900,000) mainly from 
France and the US. The fact that all the main suppliers had now turned into 
buyers of scrap seemed to support this argument; on the other hand, it was 
argued, not without reaon, by some of the private industrialists, and namely 
by Falck, that the market for scrap was bound to offer new opportunities 
because of the increase in production in the main European countries. This, 




























































































wholly on scrap, would place itself in a dependent position so far as quan­
tities and prices were concerned (11).
The coking coal and the iron ore needed to supply the integrated works 
along the Tyrrhenian coast also had to be imported. A combination of quan­
tity and quality was envisaged that would make this purchase convenient. In 
fact, counting on the high quality of North African ore, shipped at a dis­
tance of less than 1000 km., and on Ruhr coal, also shipped without 
transport interruption, the ratio of the blast furnaces was calculated as a 
particularly advantageous one, allowing a coke consumption of 850 kg. for 
one ton of pig iron against one of 1100 kg. for French blast furnaces and 
1220 kg. for German ones, according to statistics of the Coal Subcommittee 
of CEEC for 1948 employed by Finsider. (Figures taken in 1950, though con­
firming the good performance of Italian production, were far less 
impressive.) (12) The question was, therefore, seen as one of being able to 
acquire the large quantities of raw materials needed.
The question of coal supplies was seen as part of the problem of gain­
ing control of resources in the Ruhr. Sinigaglia, resuming ideas that had 
first been advanced in the interwar period, thought of the possibility of 
gaining a foothold there by offering Italian labour to man a number of coal 
mines. Contacts were made to that effect with British Occupation 
Authorities, as well as with American industrialists. The French were also 
repeatedly invited to favour an Italian participation: a question that,




























































































tended to disregard. In the same way as the Italian diplomacy failed to 
intervene on any matter concerning the future of Germany —  except by ex­
pressing in cautious terms its support for the country's reingration — , the 
industrialists seem not to have been taken very seriously in their request 
(13).
German coal, however, did become available, regaining the central 
position that had temporarily been occupied by American coal. Costs, though 
still high, tended to diminish, much to the relief of the Italians who were 
among Europe's most important coal buyers, with over 8 million tons a year 
from 1948 to 1950. Over that period imports from Germany passed from 18% to 
42% of the total, while purchases from the US had fallen from over half to 
practically nothing in 1950. (They were to resume in the late fifties with 
the fall of freight costs.) From the German side exports to Italy were 
second in importance after those to France. Italian imports were only in a 
limited measure directed towards steelmaking; in 1949 a little over one 
million tons of coking-coal was exploited in the steelworks, the greater 
part of the coke being refined in Italy (14).
The crucial issue for the implementation of the Sinigaglia Plan thus 
promised to be that of iron ore supplies. The quantities required were 
considerable; subtracting a limited , though not wholly unimportant, na­
tional output, comprising especially a good supply of pyrites, the amount of 
foreign ore needed for the full realization of the programme was calculated 




























































































that the ore mines in question were primarily those in Algeria, it was clear 
from the beginning that a working entente with France was essential for 
Italy's modernization (15).
France was proposing to assume a prominent role in the international 
steel market. At the Paris CEEC Conference, in the summer of 1947, the 
Italian representative Campilli was confronted by Alphand, economic director 
of the Quai d'Orsay, and by the Minister for Industrial Production, Lacoste, 
with the given priority on the French part to stop the rebuilding of German 
heavy industry in alleged opposition to American views. Italy, according to 
Alphand, should support this effort by signing a bilateral agreement with 
France. A support that seemed to lose much of its relevance in the view of 
Lacoste, given his assumption that the greatest part of Europe's steelmaking 
should henceforward be located on French territory, whereas Italians and 
Germans should confine themselves to the development of transforming 
capacities, especially in the field of mechanical industry (16).
French views were specified in the course of negotiations for the 
Franco-Italian Customs Union, conducted between 1947 and 1949. These nego­
tiations, forwarded by the two diplomacies, closely involved professional 
interests in many fields. The steel entente was seen by Rome, especially by 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as one of the main pillars on which the 




























































































The discussions were not easy. The French centred their requests on 
obtaining a privileged position in exports of finished products to Italy, a 
demand accepted in principle by the Italian delegation, which was composed 
of representatives both of the private sector, Falck and Braghieri, and of 
Finsider, Vignuzzi. Opinions differed, however, on what should be the 
production figure over which this priority would become effective. The 
French placed it at 2,5 million tons; the Italians one million higher, at 
3,5, a rather uncooperative attitude since official national estimates 
marked 3 million tons of production for 1952. The French went on to ask that 
Italian programmes should not contemplate steel plants of the kind already 
existing in France, with an obvious reference to the two wide strip mills 
implanted in Lorraine and Northern France. This was met with protestations 
on the Italian side (18).
After the signing of the Customs Union Treaty in March of 1949, a final 
round of negotiations in Paris at the end of May resulted in a five-year 
agreement, based on the exchange between supplies of French scrap and iron 
ore and agreed quantities of steel and pig iron imports by the Italians. 
Exports of finished products were to increase proportionally with the growth 
of Italian production —  from a minimum of 40,000 tons for a production of 2 
million to 335,000 for one of 3,5 million. Iron ore contingents were to be 
progressively increased to reach one million tons in 1953, while for scrap 





























































































The terms of the agreement contained in themselves a contradiction, it 
being clear that the aim of Italian importers of the iron ore needed for the 
new large production of steel from pig iron, was that of being able to 
satisfy internal demand and eventually exclude foreign competition. 
Nevertheless, the acceptance of the linkage proposals (exports related to 
production levels) was clearly a recognition of French leadership on the 
Italian part.
Not very different had been the situation after World War One, when the 
French had proposed to limit Italian pig iron output and to confine the 
country's steelmaking mainly to the processing of acquired semi-finished 
products. In 1923, at the time of the French occupation of the Ruhr, 
proposals for Italian participation in the exploitation of German mine pits 
had first been set forth. During 1925, conversations between steel in­
dustrialists on French provisions of scrap to Italian furnaces had resulted 
in an agreement that had made these provisions dependent on quotas of French 
exports, an accord that the Italian delegation led by Falck had found 
reasonable, though Mussolini, then Prime Minister, had prevented its en­
forcement, considering it a form of economic blackmail (20).
The period of post-World War Two Reconstruction and the launching of 
Marshall Aid witnessed the same French attempt to withhold control of German 
resources and secure for itself Germany's previous share in foreign markets. 
In the settlement of the entente with Italy a measure of ambiguity seemed to 




























































































part of the agreement on exports of steel and pig iron that they were able 
directly to fulfil. The Government, for its part, taking account of the 
opposition raised in France by the Customs Union Treaty, which failed even 
to be presented for a parliamentary vote, was in no hurry to carry out its 
own part of the obligation, related to supplies from the state-owned mines 
of Algeria, especially since it considered them as one of its most important 
negotiating assets (the most important buyer of the ore was then Great 
Britain, with quantities superior to two million tons per year) (21).
The ratification of the whole agreement was thus postponed to a better 
time. This was a disappointment for the Italian industrialists and even more 
for the Italian diplomats, striving at an overall alliance with France, as a 
first step in the direction of European integration. For another agency, the 
Ministry for Foreign Trade, the delay came as an encouragement in pursuing a 
commercial policy that tended to completely disregard the terms of the steel 
entente, to the disadvantage of its future prospects. Starting in the second 
part of 1949, a number of commercial treaties were signed allowing for large 
steel and pig iron import quotas in exchange for agricultural products that 
Italy was trying to place on foreign markets, in more or less overt competi­
tion with the French. Pig iron contingents, for example, were brought to a 
total of 160,000 tons that, once coupled with the 50% priority engagement 





























































































As a whole, comprising only the countries of the future ECSC, Italy 
figures in 1949 as the second largest importer after Holland, covering 26,9% 
of the imports. Total imports of steel and pig iron amounted to 553,000 
tons, of which 340,000 of steel products, with Belux (Belgium and 
Luxembourg) as first supplier, followed by the United States and France, the 
latter with only 30,000 tons. On the whole, these figures were not very 
impressive, considering that, among the major exporting countries, Belux 
sold in 1949 over 3,7 million tons of steel and France about 2,3 million. In 
the field of raw materials, Italian iron ore imports were still very low, 
about 110,000 tons in 1949, almost wholly from Algeria; and rising very 
little in 1950, well below the first contingents agreed upon in the entente 
with France (23).
In the last part of 1949 there was a first setback in the upward trend 
of the steel market's expansion, leading to a fall in prices and strong 
competition on foreign markets. In Europe this coincided with a sharp growth 
in West Germany's steel output, if not yet in its exports, an event that was 
bound to preoccupy the French increasingly. In fact, the realities of steel 
production levels seemed to mark the failure of the French design to curb 
Germany's future economic and political role. In 1949 German output equalled 
that of France (although remaining inferior to that of France and Same put 
together), and was expected rapidly to overcome the limit of 11 million tons 





























































































In this context some kind of framework for the reorganization of 
European steel production appeared to be necessary. Talks between steel 
industrialists of the most important countries were resumed, aimed at estab­
lishing cartel agreements such as those that had governed production and 
exports in the Twenties and Thirties. Growing cooperation between govern­
ments and the drive towards integration favoured schemes, however, that, 
though allowing for a measure of agreement between professional interests, 
left the governments with a leading role in stabilizing production and 
coordinating levels of investment and consumption. Plans to this effect had 
been presented at various European conferences, and seemed to be met with 
sympathy by at least a part of the steel industries (25).
Prospects of future overproduction were reinforced by the Rollman 
report, issued at the end of 1949, that called for a reduction of future 
projected capacities; an event that was leading the OEEC Steel Committee, in 
charge of examining investment programmes, to a more restrictive attitude, 
in particular towards those countries like Italy, Holland and Germany that 
had been the last to proceed to their modernization (26).
From the Italian point of view, the two main issues were levels of 
investment and liberalization. The weakness of the Italian steel industry in 
meeting the latter was hardly questionable, coupling the high costs of raw 
materials, due essentially to double pricing, with high internal costs of 




























































































comparative cheapness of labour, a fact amply balanced by a very low produc­
tivity and by high fiscal charges (27).
At the tariff conference of Annecy, as a result of which Italy joined 
the Gatt settlement, the steel industrialists had asked the Government to 
support very high protective tariffs, amounting to about 35% on the prin­
cipal steel products. The Government, owing to the insistence from other 
categories interested in lowering tariffs, and in the face of strong inter­
national pressures, had settled for much less. In particular, during the 
Conference, there had been requests on the part of Belgium that Italian and 
French tariffs be aligned in consideration of the steel understanding be­
tween the two countries. Moreover, the connection offered by the Italian 
delegation between advancing modernization and progressive tariff cuts was 
not one of great international appeal. In the end, the tariffs agreed upon 
at Annecy, due to become effective in Italy in July 1950, allowed for a 
consistent protection of 10 to 23%, and comparatively were very high for pig 
iron and semi-finished products, in both cases being double those of the 
French, which were already considered as high (28).
Liberalization of exchanges, brought about mostly as a result of US 
pressure for further economic integration, appeared to Italian steel in­
dustrialists as another menace, in both the Finebel version, proposed at the 
beginning of autumn 1949, and in the more ample one by OEEC, which was 
finally enforced one month later. But, since Italy did not maintain its 50% 




























































































products by March 1950, the steel industry was able to contribute to the 
process merely by drawing a list of a few insignificant items (29).
The second portion of investment programmes, comprising plans of 
Finsider, of Falck and of other small private firms, had passed scrutiny at 
the end of 1949 not without a number of objections and attempts to delay the 
decision. A particularly uncooperative attitude seems to have been held on 
that occasion by the French, who had moved in late 1949 in full support of a 
restriction of investment, a position related to their preoccupation with 
German expansion (30). This preoccupation was also casting its shadow on the 
new round of negotiations for the conclusion of the steel entente with Italy 
that took place between January and March 1950, once more coinciding with a 
renewed interest in the Customs Union. The French Government had openly 
questioned the terms of the previous agreement, lamenting the scarcity of 
Italian purchases of French goods and at the same time cutting the quan­
tities of iron ore that it was willing to supply by 60%. The objective of 
this policy was quite clear and was reinforced by the openly expressed 
suspicion that Italy was planning to connect its steelmaking once again with 
the German one; a suspicion that the Italian diplomats did not go all the 
way to dispel, though apparently contacts between Italian and German in­
dustrialists had not moved beyond a formal stage (31).
On the national stage, seemingly more contingent problems were putting 
at stake both the existing degree of internal consensus and the implementa­




























































































slackening of demand, was calling for a growing quantity of imports in the 
first months of 1950, especially in regard to semi-finished products. 
Starting in December 1949 imports reached an average of 70,000 tons a month 
against a previous figure of around 20,000. Cost disparities between inter­
nal and external producers had in fact become much higher since, in the last 
months of 1949, prices for exports had been drastically reduced, reaching 
the same level as home prices in the main European countries. Although 
comparative estimates in this field appear difficult, the difference for the 
most important steel products, such as joints, sheets and bars, seems to 
have been always around 30%, often more (32).
Attitudes towards this invasion of the internal market differed 
considerably; requests for a state centralized contingent of reasonable 
proportion were advanced by Assider, the steel producer's association; but 
the Economic Ministries, with the support of consumer industrial sectors, 
were opposed to this solution. Furthermore, some private steel firms ap­
peared to be taking advantage of the high imports of semi-finished products 
in order to establish firm control of the home market (33). At the same time 
discussion over the allocation of Counterpart Funds to the state sector was 
reaching a climax, provoking a harsh parliamentary debate (34). Problems of 
protection and modernization were reaching a critical stage, together with 





























































































With the Schuman Plan European steel problems were officially consigned 
to a major international negotiation at the diplomatic level. As a conse­
quence, links between industrial and foreign policies became more evident.
The announcement of the Plan came as a.surprise to the Italians. An 
entente between France and Germany was not, however, something new, and it 
awakened in the Italian mind a mixed sentiment of fear and eagerness to 
exploit any possible resulting opportunity.
Ambassador Quaroni, briefed by Schuman in Paris a few hours before the 
official declaration, wasted no time in pointing out the traditional Italian 
dislike for a cartel between the two most powerful steel industries on the 
continent (35). He was probably referring in the first place to the events 
of 1926, when Italy had found herself excluded from the newly created 
European Steel Cartel. This time, on the contrary, Italy was being asked to 
join as an essential member of the Western European system. The event seemed 
to imply considerable risks for the country's steelmaking. In Quaroni’s 
opinion, as well as in that of most diplomats and governmental officials, 
the steel industry was an international liability, subject to much criticism 
on the grounds of its high production costs. Nevertheless, it had to be 




























































































Under these circumstances, the most obvious solution seemed to demand a 
political commitment from the French in behalf of the country's steelmaking, 
to be used in the course of the impending conference. This was the line 
chosen by Sforza and apparently accepted by Schuman (36). Some officials, 
including Quaroni and Santoro of the Ministry of Industry, who was in charge 
of the Schuman Plan, were willing to carry this line quite a long way, and, 
though soon abandoned, proposals were voiced to the effect that any restric­
tion on Italian production quotas should automatically lead to similar cuts 
of French ones. Thus, it was argued, both steel industries would be in a 
better position to meet German demands.
Further explanations were given in the course of the weeks following 
the announcement. The chief spokesman of the Plan, Monnet, stressed the fact 
that the future European pool was not intended to be a cartel agreement 
under governmental supervision. The core of the new organization was to be a 
High Authority, entrusted with the task of creating a common market open to 
all producers regardless of their nationality. This was seen by many, in­
cluding the group of Italian officials in charge of OEEC negotiations in 
Paris, as wanting to be a "dirigiste" approach to the establishment of free- 
market conditions. Doubts, however, did persist as to the nature of the 
measures first to be taken by the new Authority, and as to how they would be 
implemented (37).
Monnet's approach to the problem of the Italian steel industry seemed a 




























































































retain great value. At the same time, he claimed to be opposed to all at­
tempts at boycotting the development of mass steel production. The only real 
test was to be an economic one: were the Italians going to be able to attain 
competitive costs once raw materials from the other countries of the 
Community had been placed at their disposal without any further price 
discrimination? (38)
Confronted with this challenge, Italian diplomacy, though remaining 
doubtful, came to the conclusion that Schuman's assurances may not have 
sufficed and that a positive adaptation to the new integrationist scheme was 
required. In the view of many, including Quaroni and Sforza, who remained 
sceptical about the fate of national .steelmaking, this would still have 
entailed the possibility of securing from the future common market adequate 
supplies of semi-finished products for the engineering industry. A middle 
course was finally steered by preparing to enter negotiations for the crea­
tion of a free market, and, at the same time, trying to obtain from the 
French the highest number of advantages, acting on the close relationship 
between the two Governments. Not surprisingly the conclusion of the Franco- 
Italian steel entente, for which a new round of talks was forthcoming, 
ranked very high among these expectations (39).
Reactions to the Schuman Plan among the industrialists seem to have 
been characterized by a common ill feeling, with some differences between 




























































































For a group of managers of Finsider, including Sinigaglia, the French 
proposal was a good opportunity to press for long term advantages. These 
were to comprise, in the first place, free access to raw materials —  scrap, 
iron ore and coking coal —  in order-to end double pricing. It was then 
thought possible to ask for the acquisition or, alternatively, a 30-year 
exploitation of a group of coal mines in the Ruhr, to be manned by Italian 
labour; and the same request was made for a numer of iron ore mines in 
Northern Africa. Though never becoming official, these demands were to gain 
for a short time some attention in political circles; in fact, they did 
nothing but take up, in somewhat perfunctory tones, points that had already 
been raised by Italian negotiators. Undoubtedly they were reminiscent of 
ideas nurtured during the last years of the Fascist regime and the first 
part of the war, when many in the industrial world had been ready to en­
visage Italy as a major producer and exporter in the Mediterranean and South 
European areas (40). In the wake of the Schuman Plan, whose real scope and 
intentions were far from clear, the moment seemed propitious to present 
Italy as the demanding partner of the French in reorganizing distribution of 
raw materials and steel capacities in Western Europe.
Falck's position was somewhat different. In his view, clearly expressed 
in a letter to Quaroni, the European pool should have included Italy mainly 
as an importing country. Two points were stressed: the possibility of pur­
chasing "large quantities" of semi-finished products from France and 




























































































A common concern was that for protection. Finsider insisted in the 
centralization of all foreign purchases by means of a state contingent, 
thereby, among other things, providing for a more effective trading policy, 
which seemed necessary to permit any kind of international understanding, as 
the experience with the French was showing. Finsider's proposal was 
criticized by the Minister of Industry, Togni, on the grounds, once more, 
that it would have raised internal costs and damaged those sectors of the 
engineering industry that relied on foreign imports. State contingents, 
reminiscent once again of the Thirties, were not popular in the liberal mood 
of post-war Italian Reconstruction, even if recommended in order to reach a 
competitive production standard (42).
To the spokesman of the Falcks, Frumento, protection by tariffs seemed 
a better reponse. Italy should have sought more favourable conditions of 
admission to the pool by raising tariffs by as much as 40%, as England had 
done before joining the European Steel Cartel in 1935 (43). Though seemingly 
better received, a similar proposal also stood little chance of being ac­
cepted, when Italian tariffs were already being criticized on the 
international level. Free-trade opinion prevailed again in the parliamentary 
discussion of the new general tariff, which, in fact, for products of steel, 
resulted in a diminuition of the levels fixed at the Annecy Conference (44).
Meetings between industrialists and officials from various Ministries 
were held in Rome at the end of May. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs relied 




























































































Plan. In its turn, the Ministry of Industry had taken good care to keep in 
close touch with most of the professional interests in the field. Officials 
of the Ministry for Foreign Trade also participated in the discussions, but 
their role seems to have been a minor one, except for the fact that they 
were criticized by all parties and blamed for the erratic commercial policy 
of the country and for exceeding the quantities of imports; a blame they 
would have liked to share with some of the importers (45).
A common feeling of distrust and uneasiness seems to have dominated 
these discussions. However disguised, the Schuman Plan was considered a 
reincarnation of the old cartel; surely it was meant, once again, to 
strangle Italian steelmaking.
Taccone, representative for Fiat, was joined by many in considering as 
likely an "attack" on the new strip mill of Cornigliano, in repetition of 
the one that had been so successfully carried out by the Germans during 
their occupation, when they had taken good care to carry home all the new 
machinery from the plant already under construction. Cornigliano was going 
to be one of the six wide strip mills of American fabrication to operate in 
Western Europe; Germany had not been allowed to install one. In the Italian 
opinion, the Schuman Plan, by removing discriminations against Germany, was 





























































































A degree of consensus was reached on two points: an attempt to nego­
tiate with the French, and the defence of production and investment levels 
already accorded by OEEC. The first was going to prove a difficult venture, 
for the French steel industrialists showed, once more, little sympathy for 
Italian views. To start with, they had taken no part in the Schuman Plan; on 
the contrary they had assumed a rather hostile attitude towards it, suspi­
cious of the power that ws being conferred to a body of technocrats. This 
did not, however, imply that they were unprepared to seize any new oppor­
tunity that the situation might offer. An edition of "Usine Nouvelle" at the 
end of May openly expressed the hope that the Italians, by joining the pool, 
would drop their long term development programme and went on to suggest that 
negotiations between the two countries should, in the meantime, be suspended 
(47). At the beginning of June, in Paris, the French delegation, backed by 
the Government (though the role played by different agencies is not com­
pletely clear), presented an official request that France should enjoy a 
fixed percentage of all Italian steel imports; this went beyond all the 
previous claims. Italian demands in the field of raw materials, though not 
totally rejected, were dismissed as unrealistic (48).
Confronted with these proposals, short of an ultimatum, the Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs took a very defensive attitude, as it had always done, 
and was prepared to leave the door open for further discussion. The delega­
tion of industrialists, on the contrary, took a negative stand (49). It is 
true that, in this regard, a difference persisted between Finsider repre­




























































































of French mineral were secured over a prolonged period, and small and medium 
industrialists in the North, led once more by Falck, who were more willing 
to accept a working agreement based on French supremacy (in the same way as, 
for example, Quaroni). It is also very likely that the French tried to 
exploit this difference, apparently without much success, although evidence 
of this is scarce. What can be said is that a common interest was certainly 
shared by some Italian private interests, French industrialists and 
governmental officials of whatever agency in stopping the implementation of 
the Sinigaglia Plan. At the end of May 1950 two more facts confirmed this: 
spokesmen of Italian private interests asked to interrupt the parliamentary 
discussion on the allocation of Counterpart Funds to Finsider that was about 
to reach a final vote; in the same days Monnet hinted to German officials 
that Italy might abandon its long term development programme as a conse­
quence of joining the Schuman Plan. A degree of apprehension seems to have 





























































































Reactions to the Schuman Plan had shown from the beginning a difference 
between the economic and the diplomatic outlook. The industrialists, or at 
least a significant part of them, were confident in their ability to reduce 
costs and raise production levels. They were, however, intent on finding the 
means to overcome a difficult period of internal re-equipment and interna­
tional reorganization. Their international standing was low and they could 
not rely on a strong diplomacy to support their interests. For the diplomats 
the starting point was one of weakness. Italy looked at the Schuman Plan as 
one more important opportunity to regain full international recognition. 
Economic considerations, no matter how important, would have had to come 
later (51).
This sense of weakness, short of frustration, led to a repeated search 
for guarantees and spelling out of conditions. Togni named four: an equal 
footing for Italy, free access to raw materials and the end of double pric­
ing, maintenance of programmes already submitted to OEEC, and the assurance 
of reliable internal and external markets. These points gave voice to the 
main concerns expressed by the industrialists, especially the first which 
provided a clear sign of the country's position of inferiority, while the 
last hinted at special safeguards to be ensured (52). On the diplomatic 




























































































asked to exercise pressure on the French, a demand renewed in the course of 
the Paris Conference (53).
Developments were to prove less devastating than expected for Italian 
interests. In the first place, the newly projected organization had a dis­
tinct feature of supranationality that could be turned into an advantage for 
its weaker members. Italian diplomatic realized this quite soon and, as in 
previous international conferences, came out in favour of a "European" 
approach, intended to present their particular claims in a better light.
Monnet had been under pressure from the Americans, who were firmly 
opposed to any scheme resembling a restrictionist industrial entente; secret 
arrangements such as the attempted Franco-Italian one were definitely out of 
date, though it is significant that they were still being discussed (54). 
For the Italians, after their unhappy experience with the Rollman report, 
still more important was the fact that the Plan did not envisage a restric­
tion of the market, and was seen, on the contrary, as encouraging expansion; 
this was in accordance with the new upward trend of world production and 
consumption as a consequence of the Korean War, which was provoking a rise 
in prices and checking the tendency towards increased exportation (55). In 
the long term, moreover, Monnet's plan of placing all producers on the same 
level inside the Europe of the Six was not incompatible with the objectives 




























































































The other line of defence, that is to say the "special relationship" 
with France, proved to be of equal value. If the Schuman Plan actually set 
aside all previous Franco-Italian bilaterial agreements, it increased, on 
the other hand, France's necessity to count on Italy as an effective second 
partner in its embrace with Germany, and thus greatly enhanced the country's 
political leverage.
In the course of negotiations the attention of the Italian in­
dustrialists was directed mainly to the questions of iron ore, prices, the 
transitional period, and provisions for scrap. Each of these issues proved 
to be extremely delicate. The solutions ultimately reached were bound to be 
greeted critically in many countries; Italy was no exception. Without at­
tempting to give an account of the workings of the Conference, it is 
interesting to look briefly at the way these points were dealt with.
Iron ore was probably the most controversial issue, especially after 
France had decided that her North African territories were not going to be 
included in the pool. The Italian delegation reacted strongly, to the point 
of nearly leaving the Conference. A solution was finally found at the top 
political level, at the Conference of Santa Margherita in February 1951, 
when France yielded to Italian requests and granted a supply of iron ore for 
the next five years that, though still judged insufficient by Sinigaglia, 
could on the whole be considered satisfactory. In the following years 




























































































the mid-Fifties, sources other than those in French North Africa would 
become available (56).
On the problem of prices, Italy was confronted with Franco-German 
proosals that allowed the exporting countries to undersell finished 
products, thus cancelling the advantage of equal prices for raw materials, 
calculated on the basis of the drawing point. A compromise was reached in 
the final part of the conference that, though not extinguishing it, reduced 
that advantage and went a long way towards eliminating unfair pricing. 
Moreover, price dispositions would apply to Italy only after the country had 
fully entered the free common market (57).
Italy was, in fact, allowed a transitional period of five years, during 
which protection of its steel production with decreasing tariffs would be 
continued. The initial tariff was to be that of Annecy, higher, as we have 
seen, than the one enforced in July 1950. Although they preferred to com­
plain about a better treatment for the Belgian coal mines, these were all 
concessions to the steel industrialists (58).
Finally, a free market for scrap was created, albeit incompletely, as 
it excluded supplies from within the industry. Behind the lines it was 
understood that the High Authority would intervene and provide for the 
supply of the neediest countries. Italy was by far the biggest importer in 




























































































quantities thereafter. To Italy's advantage various compensation schemes 
were devised to support dearer purchases of scrap on outside markets (59).
In the end, the fears first expressed by Italian steel industrialists 
did not materialize. Development plans were not put in question; on the 
contrary, they received a protective safeguard, more important than OEEC 
legimitation. The liberalization favoured Italy's purchases of raw 
materials, and the supply of coal from the Ruhr was made convenient; at the 
same time, protective measures were enacted in favour of the Italian 
cokeries, which had been the most severe opponents of the Plan (60). Special 
provisions for iron ore and scrap were obtained that met the demands both of 
Finsider and of the private firms in the North.
All these factors contributed to the extraordinary growth of the 
Italian production, proportionally by far the largest among the countries of 
the Community. The implementation of the Sinigaglia Plan, in particular with 
the works of Cornigliano, played a significant part in this process; steel 
produced in electric furnaces, however, maintained its preminence, and the 
ratio between pig iron and steel remained very low, rising only to a little 
above 30% at the end of the Fifties. On the whole, the fact that steel was 































































































I have relied on the following archival sources (abbreviations are 
given in brackets):
- Archivio storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Roma (MdAE);
- Archivio Taviani, Civitas, Roma (TAVIANI);
- Archivio Luigi Einaudi, Fondazione Einaudi, Torino (EINAUDI);
- Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma (ACS).
I have also consulted the documents of Assider, the national steel 
industrialists association; in particular:
Relazione sull'attività dall'Assider (ASSIDER-Relazione) anni 1948,
1949, 1950, 1951;
Atti ufficiali dell'Associazione (ASSIDER-Atti), anni 1948, 1949,
1950, 1951.
I have drawn valuable statistical information from Carlo Citterio, 
Profilo statistico delle siderurgie comprese nel Piano Schuman, voi. 1, 
seconda edizione interamente rifatta e aggiornata, Ufficio Studi delle 
Acciaierie e Ferriere Lombarde Falck, Sezione Ricerche Economiche e 
Statistiche, Milano, A.F.L., Falck, 1952 (referred to as CITTERIO).
I have drawn more statistical information from two publications by 
Assider:
- L'industria siderurgica italiana nei 1949 - Risulati ottenuti e
considerazioni, Milano, luglio 1950, (ASSIDER 1949);
- L'industria siderurgica italiana nel 1950 - Risultati ottenuti e
considerazioni, Milano, maggio 1951, (ASSIDER 1950).
For the many points I have omitted, I refer to my thesis in progress 




























































































N O T E S
(1) - Figures in Ingvar Svennilson, Growth and Stagnation in the
European Economy, Geneva, United Nations Economic Conmission 
for Europe,1954, pp. 262-63.
(2) -A good account of the Italian steel industry in the Thirties
is provided by Franco Bonelli, Antonia Carparelli, Martino 
Pozzobon, "La riforma siderurgica Iri fra autarchia e mercato 
(1935-42)" in Franco Bonelli (a cura di), Acciaio per l'industria­
lizzazione, Einaudi,Torino,1982,pp.217-333.
(3) - See Bruno Alessandrini, "Gli scambi commerciali dell'Italia",
EINAUDI, 1.2.Sforza. The author of the note was responsible 
for Confindustria (the industrialists' national association) 
for foreign trade and industrial foreign relations during 
the last years of the Fascist regime.
(4) - See Margherita Pelaja, "Ricostruzione e politica siderurgica",
Italia Contemporanea,148, settembre 1982,pp.5-25.
(5) - An official account of the Sinigaglia Plan is given by: Finsider,
Sistemazione della siderurgia italiana, Roma, 1948. A good 
survey is in Rosario Rcmeo, Breve storia della grande industria 
in Italia,1861-1961, Cappelli,Bologna, 1980 (first pub.1961).
(6) - Steel consumption per head in 1948 amounted in Italy to 52
..kg., compared with 182 for France, 270 for Great Eritain,
500 for US. Figures are given in Silvio Leonardi, "Necessità 
di m'industria siderurgica in Italia" Critica Economica,1950,n°2, 
pp. 48-61.
(7) - See Gianni La Bella, L'Iri nel dopoguerra, Studium, Rana,
1984. Fiat was carmitted to buy frcm 38% to 50% of Comigliano's 
production of coils. The agreement was concluded in 1948, 
but became official only in 1952.
(8) - Figures in Duncan Bum, The Steel Industry 1939-1959 - A Study 
in Competition and Planning, Cambridge U.P. 1961; and in 
ASSIDER-1950,p.55.
- See Oscar Sinigaglia, "Promemoria sulla siderurgia italiana"
ACS, Presidenza del Consiglio, Gabinetto, Segreteria Particolare 






























































































(10) - Production figures in ASSIDER-1949,pp.9-10, and in ASSIDER-
1950,p.69
(11) - See the exchange between Sinigaglia and Falck in II Mondo,
anno I, n°14, 21-5-1949, and n°15,28-5-1949.
(12) - Figures used by Finsider are given in the semi-official Attilio
Jacoboni, L'industria meccanica in Italia, a cura del Centro 
di Studi e Piani Tecnico-Econcmici istituito dal CNR e dall'Iri, 
Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, Roma, 1949. Figures taken 
in 1950 are given in ASSIDER-1950,p.49; they indicate a consumption 
of 915 kg. of coke for one ton of pig iron, as compared to 
984 in Germany and 1021 in France.
(13) - Letter of Sinigaglia to Tarchiani, 14 of August 1947, with
minutes of the meetings between Sinigaglia,Aron and Bureau 
of the 6 of August, ACS, Gabinetto, b.II/f.18. For contacts 
with the British Authorities see the minutes of a meeting 
of CIR (Comitato Interministeriale per la Ricostruzione) of 
10-1-1948 in EINAUDI,1.2.Sinigaglia. Sinigaglia hoped to 
get from 5 to 6 million tons of coal per year (Italian inports 
were about 8,5 million). For the diplcmatic side see Mario 
Toscano, "Appunti sui negoziati per la partecipazione dell'Italia 
al Patto Atlantico" in Pagine di storia diplomatica contemporanea, 
Giuffrè, Milano, 1963, voi.2 pp.445-519.
(14) Figures in CITTERIO, pp. 108-109 and in ASSIDER-1950,p.39.
(15) - The fact was recognized by Sinigaglia's Alcune note sulla
siderurgia italiana, Tipografia del Senato, Rema, 1946. According 
to Scortecci of Uva, the Italian industry had originally 
hoped to gain possession of North African ore through war 
operations; quotes in Margherita Pelaja,(note n°4), p.7.
Iron ore production amounted to about half a million tons 
a year over the period 1946-1950; production of pyrites in 
the same period was about 800.000. These were used after elimination 
of the sulphur to form an ore of good quality (58% content 
of iron). Part of the production was exported.
(16) - Campilli to Sforza, Paris 16 of July 1947, telex.n°ce/30,
EINAUDI,1.2.Ferrari Aggradi.
(17) - An account of the Franco-Italian Custurns Union is given in
William Diebold, Trade and Payments in Western Europe -A Study 




























































































(18) -A  record of these negotiations is in ASSIDER-Relazione 1948,pp.4-8
(19) - The terms of the agreement are given in ASSIDER-Atti 1949,
pp. 42-46. Steel production figures for Italy were as following: 
in 1948, 2.125.147 tons; in 1949, 2.055.499; in 1950, 2.362.430; 
see Istituto Centrale di Statistica, Sommario di statistiche 
storiche italiane, 1861-1955, Rema, 1955, pp.128-129.
(20) - Information on the steel negotiations in the Twenties is provicted
by: Antonia Carparelli, "I perchè di una 'mezza siderurgia'.
La società Uva, l'industria della ghisa e il ciclo integrale 
negli anni Venti" in Acciaio per l'industrializzazione (note 
n°2), pp.58-59; Pierre Guillen, "L'echec des tentatives d'entente 
économique avec l'Italie (1922-1929)" Relations Internationales, 
1978, n°13, pp.64-65; and Maria Angelini, "La politica estera 
italiana e il patto renano del 1925 " Annali della Facoltà 
di Scienze Politiche di Perugia, n°lO (1968-1970), pp.203-253.
(21) - ASSIDER-Atti 1949, p.98; on French exports from Algeria see
Carl Horst Hahn, Per Schuman Plan - Eine Untersuchung im besonde- 
ren Hinblick auf die deutsch-franzosische Stahlindustrie,
Richard Pflaum Verlag, München,1953,pp.40-41 (containing a 
number of malicious comments).
(22) - Observations on Italian commercial policy are contained in
a memorandum sent by Sinigaglia to De Gasperi on March 31 
of 1950, ACS, Gabinetto, b.XVII/f.126.
(23) - Figures in CITTERIO,passim; and in ASSIDER-1949,p.92.
(24) - See Duncan Burn,(note n°8),pp.138-149,398-403.
(25) - On projected cartel agreements and governmental schemes see: 
Maurice Fontaine, L'industrie sidérurgique dans le monde et 
son évolution économique depuis la seconde guerre mondiale,
P.U.F, Paris,1950,pp.350-354; and Paul Reuter, La Ccmmunauté 
Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier, Pichou et Durand Auzias, 
Paris, 1953,pp.12-22.
- See Nations Unies, Department des Affaires Economiques, "Evolution 
et perspectives de la sidérurgie européenne dans le cadre 
du marché mondial de l'acier, Préparé par la Division de l'Acier, 





























































































(27) - According to calculations of the Ministry of Industry in
1949, double prices and fiscal charges (but the impact of
the latter was much smaller) accounted for 14,5% of the final 
price of a ton of steel; see ASSIDER-1949,p.90. Carparative
figures for wages exist only for the years after 1952, given 
by the High Authority; table reported in Bums, (note n°8), 
p.431. Italy offered the lowest wages among the Six, throughout 
the Fifties. In the first years after the war the gap with
the other countries was probably higher; according to Leonardi, 
(note n°6),p.60, the salary of an Italian steel worker amounted 
in 1948 to 1/6 of an American one and 1/3 of an English one. 
Figures for productivity (ibid, p.55) gave, in 1948A 26 yearly 
tons a worker in Italy,against 56 in France, 87 in Great Britain, 
167 in the US. Italian social charges according to Sinigaglia, 
(note n°22) amounted to 67% of retributions, against 40% for 
France and 13% for US.
(28) - On Italy at the Annecy Conference see Diebold (note n° 17),p.221;
a record in ASSIDER-Atti 1949,pp.75-77. A comparative estimate 
of Annecy tariffs for Italy, France and Belgium is given by 
Assider, Misura dei dazi doganali di importazione dei principali 
prodotti siderurgici in alcuni paesi dopo gli accordi di Ginevra 
e di Annecy, relazione n°2, Milano 26/11/49. In the period 
up to July 1950 protection was secured not very effectively 
by import licenses.
(29) - Reactions of industrialists to liberalization of exchanges
in ASSIDER-Atti 1949, pp.104-108.
(30) - See the Report by Frumento on the works of the 0EEC Steel
Committee, 5 and 6 October of 1949, MdAE, Ambasciata di Parigi, 
447/1.
(31) - Quaroni to Sforza, 13 of January 1950, MdAE, Direzione Generale
Affari Politici ( hence AP), Francia 30; also ASSIDER-Atti
1950, verbali riunione Cons. dir. del 25/3.
(32) - Figures in ASSIDER-1950,pp.66,96,102-106.
(33) - Record of discussion in ASSIDER-Relazione 1950, pp.50-54;
Confederazione Generale dell'Industria Italiana, Annuario 
1950, Roma, luglio 1950,p.44, speaks of the importations of 
steel and attributes them mostly to national steel producers, 




























































































(34) - The Government had devolved practically the whole 14 billion
Lira allocation to Finsider, provoking loud protests frcm 
private interests. Records of the debate in ATTI PARLAMENTARI, 
Senato della Repubblica, Resoconti e discussioni, 1948-50, 
v.XIII,Rana,1950.
(35) - Quaroni to Sforza, 9 of May 1950, MdAE, Ambasciata di Parigi,
478/1, t. (elegraitma) n°164-165. On the Italian attitude 
toward the steel cartel see Giovanni Falck, "Il cartello del 
ferro", La Metallurgia italiana, XVII, dicembre 1926, n° 12, 
pp.512-516; and Ervin Hexner, The International Steel Cartel, 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina U.P.,1943. Officially the Italians 
refused to join fearing that the fixation of production quotas 
would hamper the prospects of the country's growing steel 
capacity. It appears, though, that the exclusion came to 
the industrialists and to the Government as a severe blow, 
coming after the failure of an entente with France in the 
early Twenties (see note n° 20).
(36) - Sforza to Quaroni, 10 of May 1950, MdAE, Amb. di Parigi, 478/1.
(37) - See the Report by Frumento "Recenti indicazioni sul Piano
Schuman e sulla intesa italo-francese", containing a summary 
of discussions among Italian officials in Paris, Parigi, 30/5/1950 
e 2/6/50, MdAE, Direzione Generale Affari Economici (AE),I/1
(38) - Quaroni to Sforza, 26 and 27 of May 1950, MdAE, Amb.di Parigi,
478/1,t. n° 213 and 217.
(39) - Memorandum on Italy and the Schuman Plan, 2 of June 1950,
MdAE, AE, Piano Schuman, 1/1.
(40) - See note without date, but around the first half of 1950,
"Condizioni per la nostra accettazione", by Sinigaglia, Manuelli, 
Vignuzzi, MdAE, ffi, Piano Schuman, I/1.0n discussions during 
the war, useful information in the article by Bonelli and 
others (note n°2). The figure of 10 million tons of yearly 
steel production was one of the war-tine fantasies.
(It was, however, reached in the early Sixties).
(41) - Letter by Giovanni Falck to Quaroni, 23 of May, Rome, MdAE,
Amb. di Parigi, 478/1. Giovanni Falck was the son of Giovanni 
Enrico Falck, the founder of the firm and its president until 
1945. Together with Giovanni, owners of the firm were the 




























































































(42) - Note by Sinigaglia and others (note n°40); and minutes of
meetings held at the Ministry of Industry on the 27 of May 
1950, MdAE, Arab, di Parigi, 478/1.
(43) - See Report by Frumento on the preparatory talks of the Committee
for Schuman Plan negotiations, 22 of May 1950, MdAE, Arab di 
Parigi, 478/1.
(44) - The internal discussion on the new tariff in ATTI PARLAMENTARI,
Camera dei Deputati, Atti, Discussioni 1950, Seduta CDXV,
Roma 1950. The new steel tariff enforced on a temporary basis, 
offered a protection of nearly 8% less than the Annecy one 
for semi-finished products (15% against 23%), see ASSIDER- 
Relazione 1950,pp. 17-25.
(45) - See minutes (note n°42).
(46) - See minutes (note n°42).
(47) - Letter of Repetti (Assider) to Notarangeli (Ministero Esteri),
30 of May 1950, with the text of an article appeared in "Usine 
Nouvelle", of the 25 of May, MdAE, AE, Piano Schuman, IV/1.
On the attitude of the French steel industrialists: Report
by Frumento (note n° 37); Maurice Fontaine (note n°25);
and H.W. Ehrmann, "The French Trade Association and the Ratification
of the Schuman Plan", World Politics, 6,IV, 1954.
(48) -• See Report by Frumento (note n°37).
(49) - For the view taken in Rome on the talks see Nòte of Grazzi
to Sforza, 28 of May 1950, MdAE, AE, Piano Schuman, IV/1.
(50) - See Babuscio Rizzo to Sforza, 26 of May 1950, MdAE, AE, Piano
Schuman, IV/1, t.n°69-70. For discussion in Parliament see 
ATTI PARLAMENTARI, (note n°34) CDXXIV Seduta.
(51) - The Italian foreign policy line had been effectively summarized
by Sforza in a press conference of the 4 of April 1950, MdAE,
AP, Italia, 233. Interesting observations in Ennio Di Nolfo,
"Das Problem der eurcpaischen Einigung als ein Aspekt der 
italienishen Aussenpolitik, 1945-1954", Vierteljahrhefte fur 
Zeitgeshichte, 1980, 2, pp. 145-167.




























































































(53) - Tarchiani to Sforza, S of June 1950, MdAE, AE, Piano Schuman,
IV/1, n°6059/3534.
(54) - It is clear fran the reports on discussions in Paris (note
n°37) that French and German industrialists vere keen to resume 
old cartel agreements, and highly suspicious of the Schuman 
Plan. This was just what officials of ECA were afraid of; 
see on this last point Diebold (note n°17) pp.280-292. For 
this reason attitude of the US on Franco-Italian Customs Union 
has become luke-warm in 1949-50; interesting observations 
in Alan S. Milward, "L'integrazione dell'Europa occidentale 
negli anni dell'EEP: l'esperienza del Gruppo di Studio Europeo 
per l'Unione Doganale" in II Piano Marshall e l'Europa, a 
cura di Elena Aga Rossi, Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana, 
Roma, 1983, pp.109-118.
(55) - On expansionist policies and tendencies on the international
steel market observations in the classic William Diebold,
The Schuman Plan - A Study in Economie Cooperation,1950-1959, 
Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, by Frederick 
A. Praeger, New York 1959. The Italians, encouraged by the 
same Monnet, insisted, for obvious reasons, on the necessity 
to allow continued expansion; see documents quoted in notes 
n°38 and 39.
(56) - The Accord contenplated the following supplies of iron ore
to Italy: for the first year, 480.000 tons; for the second,
. 575.COO; for the third, 650.000; for the fourth, 800.000; 
and for the fifth and last 830.000. See ASSIDER-Relazione 
1951 pp.36-55.
(57) - Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community,
articles 60 and 61; see Sinigaglia to Togni, 8 of August 
1950, TAVIANI, Piano Schuman, 1950-52.
(58) - Treaty Establishing... Convention on the Transitional Provisions,
art. 30.
(59) - Treaty Establishing...Annex II; see Burn (note n°8),p.422.
(60) - On the reactions of the cokeries to the Schuman Plan see the
comments by Taviani, head of the Italian delegation to the 
Paris Conference; Paolo Qnilio Taviani, Solidarietà atlantica 
e Comunità Europea, Le Monnier, Firenze, 1967, (prima ed.
1954), pp. 166-169. A certain degree of protection for Italian 
coke was allowed by Treaty Establishing...Convention on the 
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